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Introduction
In August 2007, I attended a meeting convened by NTB1 government officials for 
police officers, intelligence officials, and non-government activists to address concerns 
about the upcoming 2008 gubernatorial elections. Halfway through the proceedings, a 
tense discussion arose, and people became concerned about my presence at the 
meeting, as "sensitive" matters relating to potential conflict were being discussed. 
Without being given any opportunity to allay their concerns, or protest my removal, I 
quickly was escorted from the meeting. I sat outside in the foyer of a Senggigi hotel, 
where the hotel acoustics fortunately kept me in earshot of the proceedings. I was 
frustrated by my ejection from the meeting, but the magnitude and difficulties 
involved in the preparations for the 2008 elections had been brought home to me. 
Underpinning my removal and the anxiety felt by all participants in the discussion was 
the fear that during the elections the provincial capital of Mataram, home to the 
various political party campaign headquarters, could explode into political violence.
Fortunately, violence did not erupt during the 2008 elections, and this raises the 
question of how conflict was avoided, the answer to which is the foundation of this
1 Lombok, together with the island of Sumbawa, constitute the eastern Indonesian Province of Nusa 
Tenggara Barat (NTB).
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article. This essay provides a unique perspective on the study of conflict in Indonesia, 
as most literature to date has investigated situations where communal or political 
violence has occurred. With the fall of President Suharto in 1998, an event that sparked 
a wave of violence across Indonesia, including Jakarta, Solo, and Ambon, the study of 
Indonesian communal and political conflict has become a rich source of literature.2 
However, this article inverts the analysis by considering "where violence does not 
occur."3 Edward Aspinall has noted the importance of this approach, arguing that
... understanding the structural, contextual, and organizational dynamics of each 
violent episode is crucial, but if we want to understand overall patterns and 
develop general models, it is surely equally important to explore those instances 
where (presumably) mechanisms for peaceful regulation of ethnic and religious 
inter-group relations worked well.4
Studying the absence of violence is challenging, because violence is often vivid and its 
effects immediately apparent, while its avoidance is harder to assess definitively. 
However, if violence is anticipated and yet does not occur, it is useful to investigate 
why, and what, if any, conflict avoidance mechanisms were applied.5
This article's direction is supported by the work of Ashutosh Varshney, who has 
studied places of "ethnic peace" rather than ethnic conflict.6 Varshney's research 
investigates several Indian cities and asks why communal and political conflict was 
avoided or resolved quickly in certain places, while other communities had turned 
violent. Varshney concludes that, in the Indian context, in places where violence was 
avoided, networks of professional relationships across ethnic and religious divides 
were integral to reducing social tensions and could therefore prevent violence from
2 A significant amount of literature has been written about communal and political violence in Indonesia 
over the decade since the fall of President Suharto. These works include, among others, Freek Colombijn 
and Thomas Lindblad, ed., Roots o f Violence in Indonesia: Contemporary Violence in Historical Perspective 
(Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002); Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004); Kasuma Snitwongse and W. Scott Thompson, ed., Ethnic Conflicts in 
Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005); Jemma Purdey, Anti-Chinese Violence 
in Indonesia, 1996-1999 (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2006); Charles A. Coppel, ed., Violent 
Conflicts in Indonesia: Analysis, Representation, Resolution (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006); John Sidel, Riots, 
Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007); Jamie S.
Davidson, From Rebellion to Riots: Collective Violence on Indonesian Borneo (Madison, WI: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2008); Ashutosh Varshney, Collective Violence in Indonesia (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2010). This survey of the literature is limited to the period following the fall of President 
Suharto. There is also a large body of literature on the period of Indonesia's independence struggle and 
the anti-communist violence of 1965-66.
1 Edward Aspinall, "Ethnic and Religious Violence in Indonesia: A Review Essay," Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 62,4 (2008): 569.
4 Ibid., pp. 569-70.
5 The issues investigated in this article surrounding conflict management should not be studied in 
isolation. The government officials involved, and their non-state counterparts, exist within a context 
shaped, in parf, by a historical legacy, which includes the maintenance of security structures that existed 
under the New Order Suharto regime. However, there is a new socio-political context that has developed 
in the post-Suharto Reformasi period. Decentralization and democratization mean that the processes 
adopted for managing conflict during the New Order need to be reconsidered with fresh eyes and new 
semantics adopted. This article offers a fresh perspective and rhetorical framework.
6 Ashtush Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Fife: Hindus and Muslims in India (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2002), pp. 5-9.
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erupting/ Varshney's findings are context-specific, but they allude to mechanisms for 
conflict avoidance that rely on community relationships. The notion that relationships 
among political, religious, and community actors are key to maintaining peace is also 
drawn out in this article, and I demonstrate how religious networks have been integral 
to maintaining social harmony in Lombok.
First, I will discuss particular points of social tension and outbreaks of violence that 
occurred on the island to assist the reader in understanding anxieties in Lombok about 
potential election violence. The subsequent two sections center on the influential local 
religious leaders, Tuan Guru, and their involvement in conflict management during the 
2008 elections. These religious leaders and their organizations played a broadly 
positive role during the elections. Their socio-political role is complex, however, and 
their actions in the past have sometimes led to violence, particularly in relation to their 
involvement in the creation of local militia groups and their arguably irresponsible 
behavior towards minority religious groups (including the Ahmadiyah sect).7 8 The 
article then examines, as a case study, the 2008 NTB gubernatorial elections and the 
conflict-management strategy successfully deployed during that contest.
Lineage of Violence
... we needed to cool our emotions—conflicts will not make us happy ... 
— Satriawan, Mataram Electoral Commission Member9
As Satriawan's words, quoted here, suggest, members of Lombok's local political 
elite were well aware of the need to keep tensions from boiling over during elections.10 
One of the major flashpoints concerning election planners was the political rivalry that 
coalesced along ethnic lines,11 involving Sasak12 and Bimanese13 political coalitions, as 
occurred during the 2003 NTB gubernatorial elections.
7 Ibid., pp. 46-51. See, also, another example of conflict avoidance in India described from a historical 
perspective in Anna Bigelow, "Saved by the Saint: Refusing and Reversing Partition in Muslim North 
India," The Journal of Asian Studies 68,2 (2009): 435-64.
8 Muslim religious leaders, as well as their counterparts in other faiths, can play constructive roles within 
society, but they have also been the instigators of social unrest and violence. As a point of comparison, the 
role of religious leader as provocateur has been discussed in relation to Indian communal conflict. See 
Stanley J. Tambiah, Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 230-43; Paul R. Brass, Theft of an Idol: Text and Context in the 
Representation o f Collective Violence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 126-28; Paul R. 
Brass, The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India (Seattle, WA: University of 
Washington Press), pp. 241—43.
9 Asrori S. Kami, "Roots of Tolerance Sprang Out from the Ashes of Conflict," in A Celebration of Democracy: 
A Journalistic Portrayal o f Indonesia's 2004 Direct Elections Amongst Moderate and Hardline Muslims, ed. Asrori 
S. Kami (Jakarta: PT Era Media Informasi, 2006), p. 285.
10 Direct elections of local government leaders have led to large demonstrations and political controversies 
elsewhere in Indonesia. See Nankyung Choi, "Elections, Parties, and Elites in Indonesia's Local Politics," 
South East Asia Research 15,3 (2005): 329-30; and International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Preventing Violence in 
Local Elections, Asia Report No. 197, December 2010. The potential for large-scale protests and conflict in 
Lombok thus has precedents elsewhere in the archipelago.
11 Ethnicity is a means of mobilizing social activity and bringing people together in many parts of 
Indonesia. See Adam D. Tyson, Decentralization and Adat Revivalism in Indonesia: The Politics o f Becoming
56 Jeremy J. Kingsley
One of the major structural impetuses for violence and conflict has been, and 
continues to be, the island's high levels of poverty and economic marginalization, 
which can be used by provocateurs to foment trouble. Lombok's approximately 3.2 
million residents are among Indonesia's most economically disadvantaged. 12 34 
Approximately 25 percent of the population is designated as living in poverty,15 and 
the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics consistently ranks NTB among the lowest three 
provinces on its "Human Development Rankings."15 The levels of poverty in Lombok 
have been perpetuated by historical periods of famine and ongoing malnutrition 
among children and adolescents. With this level of poverty comes the potential for 
communal violence based on economic jealousies and distress that can be manipulated 
by political, ethnic, religious, or business interests.1'
Poverty renders socio-economically disadvantaged people in Lombok more liable 
to be coopted by political leaders who seek to use them as a "rent-a-crowd" in order to 
advance a particular political agenda. This tactic usually involves the distribution of 
money to facilitate participation in demonstrations.18The former NTB governor, Lalu 
Serinata, for example, believed that money was distributed to secure participants for 
the January 2000 riots.19 On this occasion, the monetary payment was estimated to be 
Rp 5000 per person (less than AU$ l).20 Early in my time in Lombok, I also witnessed 
the distribution of money at a demonstration that turned violent outside the attorney- 
general's office in Mataram. Protestors stormed the grounds of the office but were 
deterred from entering the building by the ominous sight of riot police in full 
protective gear, thumping their shields with batons in a menacing manner.
The collapse of the island's tourism industry, a casualty of the 1997 Asian economic 
crisis, exacerbated this history of economic distress. The economic downturn had 
obvious social consequences, such as increasing the number of child beggars in 
Mataram.21 Greater economic stress at that time led many residents in Mataram, and
Indigenous (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2010), p. 105. Having said this, I would add that the 
manner in which ethnicity is understood and expressed varies across the Indonesian archipelago.
12 Sasak are the indigenous ethnic group of Lombok.
13 Bimanese are an indigenous ethnic group from Sumbawa.
14 The dire economic situation is ongoing. There were reports of malnutrition leading to the deaths of two 
children in East Lombok during 2011. See Panca Nugraha, 'Two Die as Malnutrition Continues to Ravage 
NTB," The Jakarta Post, May 23, 2011, at www.thejakartapost.com, at http://www.thejakartapost.com/ 
news/ 2011 / 05/ 23/ two-die-malnutrition-continues-ravage-ntb.html
15 "24 Persen Penduduk NTB Miskin," Lombok Post, August 5, 2007, p. 1; "1,5 Juta Penduduk NTB Masih 
Miskin," Lombok Post, October 18, 2007, p. 9; and Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi NTB, Nusa Tenggara Barat 
Dalam Angka 2010 (Mataram: Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi NTB, 2010), p. 67.
16 The Human Development Rankings are a measurement of development calculated through combining 
factors such as life expectancy, educational attainment, and income.
17 Poverty is considered one of the potential ingredients sparking violence in Indonesia, and, therefore, 
poverty alleviation programs have been a priority for international aid agencies. See Sidel, Riots, Pogroms, 
Jihad, p. ix.
18 Interview with Lalu Serinata, in Mataram, January 8, 2008. See also Jeremy Kingsley, "Democracy, 
Conflict, and Islamic Leadership in Eastern Indonesia: A Village Election Case Study," Islam, Syari'ah, and 
Governance Background Paper Series, Center for Islamic Law and Society, Melbourne Law School, the 
University of Melbourne, April 2011.
19 Interview with Lalu Serinata, in Mataram, January 8, 2008.
20 Ibid.
21 "Anak Jalanan Menjamur Pasca Kerusuhan Mataram," Lombok Post, February 6, 2000, p. 9.
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Lombok more generally, to feel that their personal safety was under threat. Many 
people feared to venture out at night, afraid that they might be robbed or assaulted.22 
In the broader national context, the Asian economic crisis also led to serious political 
instability and large protests across Indonesia, eventually culminating in the downfall 
of President Suharto in May 1998 after over thirty years of authoritarian rule.23 This 
event dramatically changed Indonesia's political landscape.
The national changes had profound symbolic and practical effects on Lombok. The 
end of the Suharto era, in Lombok and throughout Indonesia, brought on 
democratization, and, importantly, decentralization of political authority—this period 
is known as Reformasi (reformation).24 These reforms saw a significant power shift to 
local political elites. For Lombok, this was a dramatic turning point, because the island 
had been subject to control by outsiders for over three hundred years,25 starting with 
Balinese rule in 1677 and ending with the fall of President Suharto in 1998.26The 
political changes brought on with Reformasi had many positive effects, but also led to 
new political competition between rival ethnic and political elites. The local elites were 
not necessarily prepared for having such access to power, which created previously 
unconsidered points of tension.27 It was in this volatile environment that government 
officials started planning the 2008 elections.
22 For a discussion of this instability and the "insecurity" that had been generated in Lombok over this 
period, see Stein Kristiansen, "Violent Youth Groups in Indonesia: The Cases of Yogyakarta and Nusa 
Tenggara Barat," Sojourn 18,1 (2003): 110-38; Kari Telle, "Dharma Power: Searching for Security in Post- 
New Order Indonesia," Social Analysis 53,1 (2009): 141-56.
23 The end of the Suharto era has been discussed in J. G. Taylor, Indonesia Peoples and Histories (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 4; and Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and 
Regime Change in Indonesia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).
24 The process of Reformasi in Indonesia, particularly the introduction of decentralization and democracy, 
is discussed in a broad body of literature. See Harold Crouch, "The Key Determinants of Indonesia's 
Political Future" ISEAS Working Paper No. 7, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002; Henk 
Schulte Nordholt and Gusti Asnan, ed., Indonesia in Transition: Work in Progress (Yogyakarta: Pustaka 
Pelajar, 2003); Marcus Mietzner, "Local Elections and Autonomy in Papua and Aceh; Mitigating or Fueling 
Secessionism?," Indonesia 84 (October 2007): 1-39; Leo Schmit, "Decentralisation and Legal Reform in 
Indonesia: The Pendulum Effect," in Indonesia Law and Society, ed. Tim Lindsey (Annandale, NSW: The 
Federation Press, 2008), pp. 146-190; J. G. Coen Holtzappel and Martin Ramstedt, eds., Decentralization and 
Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: Implementation and Challenges (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2009); M. A. Miller, Rebellion and Reform in Indonesia: Jakarta's Security and Autonomy Policies in Aceh 
(London: Routledge, 2009); Michael Buehler, "Decentralisation and Local Democracy in Indonesia: The 
Marginalisation of the Public Sphere," in Problems in Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and 
Society, ed. Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 
pp. 267-86.
25 See W. Cool, The Dutch in the East: An Outline of the Military Operations in Lombock [Lombok], 1894 (Batavia: 
Kolff, 1897); A. van der Kraan, Lombok: Conquest, Colonization, and Underdevelopment, 1870-1940 (Singapore: 
Heinemann Educational Books, 1980), pp. 16-58; L. Avonius, Reforming Wetu Telu: Islam, Adat, and the 
Promises of Regionalism in Post-New Order Lombok (Helsinki: Yliopistopaino, 2004), pp. 4-5; John M. 
MacDougall, "Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists?: Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the 
Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Suharto Lombok" (PhD dissertation, Princeton 
University, 2005), pp. 302-6.
20 The decentralization laws promulgated in 1999 provided the legal infrastructure for this political 
transformation.
27 Earlier attempts at local political empowerment in Lombok were swiftly quashed during President 
Suharto's New Order period. Members of the local political elite were "burned" politically in the 1980s 
when they attempted to appoint one of their own as governor. The renegade legislators were "dragged 
into military intelligence headquarters and [their] political careers were ruined." See MacDougall, 
"Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists?," pp. 76-77.
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Adding to these general tensions, a series of violent incidents in Lombok during 
the decade preceding the 2008 gubernatorial elections heightened the uneasiness of the 
local political and religious elite. I have categorized these episodes variously as 
communal violence (related to religious or ethnic tensions), political violence (based on 
political competition), and criminal violence (or the fear of it). These disruptive incidents 
reinforced the belief that there was a serious potential for violence during the elections, 
and this led to the development of the provincial government's conflict-management 
strategy designed to avoid or resolve outbreaks of violence.
Communal violence was unleashed in Lombok during riots in January 2000 targeting 
the island's Indonesian Chinese minority.28 The riots lasted five days and led to 
significant property damage, including the razing or demolition of churches, homes, 
and commercial properties.29 Over five thousand rioters caused an estimated Rp 60 
billion (AU$ 7.5 million) in property damage.30 The riots also led approximately 7,500 
Indonesian Chinese (and other non-Muslim residents) to flee to Bali or further afield.31 
These departures subsequently hampered the region's efforts to recover from the riots, 
because many of the key local traders and businesspersons had fled.32 It has been 
suggested that this exodus meant that at least 80 percent of the local entrepreneurs left 
the island, taking with them their business acumen and much of their capital. In order 
to entice entrepreneurs back to Lombok, provincial authorities compensated those 
whose property was damaged or destroyed.33 While many Indonesian Chinese made 
their way back to Mataram and West Lombok in the following months, hundreds have
28 The violence that affected Lombok was part of a larger pattern of social and political instability across 
Indonesia. To a large degree, this stemmed from the fall of President Suharto and the weakening of state 
structures, such as law enforcement. See Tim Lindsey, "The Criminal State: Premanisme and the New 
Indonesia," in Indonesia Today: Challenges of History, ed. Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), p. 284. One of the consequences of the weakness of the state 
was the rise of militia groups across the archipelago. See Ian Douglas Wilson, "Continuity and Change: 
The Changing Contours of Organized Violence in Post-New Order Indonesia," Critical Asian Studies 38,2 
(2006): 265-97; John M. MacDougall, "Criminality and the Political Economy of Security in Lombok," in 
Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia, ed. Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van 
Klinken (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007). Also, for discussion of state weakness in Lombok during the period 
i mmediately after President Suharto's resignation, and its parlous status generally, see Jeremy Kingsley, 
"Tuan Guru, Community, and Conflict in Lombok, Indonesia" (PhD dissertation, University of Melbourne, 
2010), pp. 33-46.
29 The riots caused the razing or demolition of 20 churches, 740 homes, 62 shops, 24 restaurants, 5
bar/ restaurants, 36 cars and motorbikes, 23 villas, 41 hotel bungalows, 11 shop houses, 30 warehouses, 20 
public buildings, 1 hairdressing salon, 2 banks, 2 medical clinics, and 3 offices. See "Meredam Konflik, 
Menghidupkan Kasadaran Multikultur," Religi, April 16, 2007, pp. 17-19.
30 "Kerusuhan Mataram, Keluguan Pemuda Yang Membawa Petaka," Lombok Post, February 22, 2000, p. 1.
31 Jana Mason, "Shadow Plays: The Crisis of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Indonesia," 
United Nations Refugee Agency (2001), at www.unhcr.org/ refworld/ docid/ 3ae6a5856.html, accessed on 
January 16, 2012. The hasty departure by Lombok's Indonesian Chinese community was also discussed in 
Kari Telle, "Swearing Innocence: Performing Justice and 'Reconciliation' in Post-New Order Lombok," in 
Reconciling Indonesia: Grassroots Agency for Peace, ed. Birgit Brauchler (London and New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2009), p. 59.
3~ "Sebagian Besar Pengusaha Keturunan Alami Trauma," Lombok Post, February 3, 2000.
33 "Korban Kerusuhan Akan Dapat Bantuan," Lombok Post, April 18, 2000, p. 9.
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not returned. Moreover, many of those who did return still live with a high level of 
anxiety about their personal and family security.34
During the violence, several deaths and injuries were reported. Those killed were 
rioters shot by police or the military. The exact number of fatalities is unclear. The 
International Crisis Group35 and the local social affairs magazine Religi36 placed the 
death toll at five. Academic Stein Kristiansen believes, however, that the death toll was 
seven.37 There is also evidence to suggest that both these figures are underestimates. 
Anecdotally, I have been informed that several rioters were allegedly shot by soldiers 
outside a large charismatic church situated on an Indonesian military base in Mataram, 
and I believe these losses have not been incorporated into the figures cited.38 
Additionally, 152 people suffered minor injuries as a result of their participation in the 
violence.39
In the second category, I have defined political violence as conflicts that emerge from 
competition within Lombok's local and provincial politics. These clashes arose when 
Reformasi created a new political dynamic through democratization and 
decentralization, and the "rewards of office" led to intermittent violence in Indonesia, 
for "privileged control over vital state and societal resources" was at stake.40 In the 
Lombok-based electoral politics discussed in this article, conflict emerged primarily, 
although not exclusively, between Sasak and Bimanese adversaries for political office.
In this category of political violence, three incidents that occurred in Lombok 
during the decade before the 2008 elections stand out. First, in 1999, there were clashes 
between supporters of local candidates for the national elections, leading to physical 
confrontations that left several supporters requiring hospitalization.41 Second, on the 
morning of July 21, 2003, as local provincial legislators gathered to decide who should 
be the next NTB governor, a police cordon surrounded the provincial legislative 
buildings in Mataram. The barricade not only constituted a security measure, but was 
also symbolic of the tension generated by the first genuine legislative election for NTB 
governor.42 There was concern that the situation outside the legislative building would 
erupt violently, and local police feared that supporters of the rival candidates would
34 These anxieties were clearly expressed to me when I was looking for a rental property early in 2007. As I 
inspected potential houses with an Indonesian Chinese businessman, John, he kept stressing the 
importance of personal security. He mentioned these issues with specific reference to the 2000 riots.
35 International Crisis Group, "The Perils of Private Security Groups in Indonesia: Guards and Militias on 
Bali and Lombok" (2003), http:/ / www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/067- 
the-perils-of-private-security-in-indonesia-guards-and-militias-on-bali-and-lombok.aspx, accessed on 
January 17, 2012.
36 "Meredam Konflik, Menghidupkan Kasadaran Multikultur," Religi, April 16, 2007, pp. 17-19.
37 Stein Kristiansen, "Violent Youth Groups in Indonesia: The Cases of Yogyakarta and Nusa Tenggara 
Barat" (2003) 18 Sojourn 18,1 (2003): 123.
38 My source for this information was a participant in my research, named John, who told me this 
confidentially.
39 "Meredam Konflik, Menghidupkan Kasadaran Multikultur," pp. 17-19.
40 Robert Hefner, "Religion and Violence in Post-Suharto Indonesia," The Journal of Asian Studies 67,1 (2008): 
673.
41 "Oknum TNI dan Polri Baku Hantam," Lombok Post, May 3,1999, p. 1.
42 Previous elections of NTB's governor in the provincial legislature were merely a formality. This issue is 
discussed in greater detail later in this article. See also Nankyung Choi, "Local Elections and Democracy in 
Indonesia: The Riau Archipelago," Journal of Contemporary Asia 37 (2007): 330.
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clash and then storm the compound. The concerns were proven to be at least partially 
correct, as fights broke out among rival groups. These clashes were between Sasak and 
Bimanese supporters of rival candidates for governor.43 Neither of these clashes was 
particularly intense, however, they indicated that political competition did have the 
propensity to turn violent.
The third incident exposes the potential for election-related violence to turn deadly. 
In 2006, a major Mataram university, Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan Mataram 
(IKIP Mataram, Institute of Teaching and Educational Sciences), elected a Sasak rektor 
(university president). Bimanese students protested against this election result, and it 
has been alleged that the newly appointed rektor or one of his associates paid preman 
(thugs) to beat up the protestors, although no one was ever brought to trial. The 
struggle caused the death of one student and the hospitalization of several others.44
Another aspect of this political violence, which was preying on the minds of people 
in Lombok, was that the local elite involved in the 2008 elections were under intense 
external political pressure. The pressure on political figures was particularly strong, as 
the national headquarters of political parties such as Golkar saw this as a litmus test of 
their local relevance.45 The calm that prevailed during these elections is even more 
impressive if we take into account the fact that former governor Serinata was recently 
jailed for corruption and that investigations into his corrupt activities had commenced 
prior to the 2008 election campaign and potentially threatened to disrupt the electoral 
process.46 During the election period and its immediate aftermath, there was a real 
possibility that the investigations could anger people and incite violence among 
Serinata's supporters and close allies. Given this situation, the avoidance of violence 
was a particularly significant accomplishment, as many of the key candidates and 
political operatives were under serious pressure to succeed in the contest because an 
electoral victory may have insulated them from criminal prosecution.
The third category of violence—criminal violence (or the fear of it)—emerged as a 
serious concern in Lombok in the wake of the economic crisis and the political 
instability of the late 1990s. Lombok residents perceived a "crime wave" to be afoot 
and expressed increased fears of theft and violent offences.47 During this period, the
t3 R. Husaenie Sayuti and M. Faqih Langitan, Perjnhmnn Orang Sasak Menjadi Gubernur (Mataram:
Pantheon Media Pressindo, 2006), pp. 55-62.
44 "Rektor IKIP Bisa Jadi Tersangka," Lombok Sumbawa Online (2006), at http:/ / www.lomboknews.com/ 
2006/10/06/ rektor-ikip-mataram-bisa-jadi-tersangka A participant also discussed these events; see 
author's interview with Yon [pseud.], in Mataram, August 6, 2008.
45 "Pilkada NTB Adalah Ujian," Lombok Post, September 9, 2007, p. 1.
46 The investigation was slow moving and marred by prosecutorial incompetence. See "Mantan Gubernur 
NTB Lalu Serinata Ditahan di LP Mataram," Kompas, October 27, 2008, at http: / / nasional.kompas.com/ 
read/2008/10/27/19062253/mantan.gubernur.ntb.ditahan.di.lp.mataram; Jeremy Kingsley, "D-Day for 
Corruption Reform," Inside Indonesia (2009), at http: / / insideindonesia.org/weekly-articles-96-apr-june- 
2009/d-day-for-anti-corruption-reform-24051763; and Panca Nugraha, "Former Governor Sent to Jail to 
Serve his Sentence," The Jakarta Post, July 29, 2010, at www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/07/29/ 
former-governor-sent-jail-serve-his-sentence.html. See also "Izin Gubernur NTB," Kompas, August 8, 2007, 
p. 3.
47 The perceived "crime wave" is puzzling. Many informants told me of their genuine feelings of insecurity 
during this period of transition. Flowever, the criminal matters lodged with the Pengadilan Negeri 
(Magistrates Court) Mataram do not necessarily support these claims about a crime wave. Even if one 
doubts the reality of the supposed crime wave, it remains true that feelings of insecurity among Lombok 
residents during this period were real and had tangible effects.
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category of criminal violence was not necessarily marked by particular events, but 
rather reflected a general atmosphere of fear.48
Pamswakarsa (private militias) emerged in response to people's heightened sense of 
vulnerability to crime. These militia groups grew out of ronda (night watches) in local 
communities49 where residents undertake shifts of guard duty to ensure that their 
community remains safe after dark. Although pamswakarsa were initially created in 
Lombok to combat crime, they were themselves often out of control. These groups 
launched an assault on "crime" between 1999 and 2007,50 yet rather than suppressing 
criminality, they often left havoc in their wake.51 Militia involvement in criminal 
violence fueled the overall socio-political tensions in the region, and pamswakarsa are 
alleged to have instigated sporadic outbursts of violence in the pre-election period.
These three categories of violence are interconnected, and the effects of these 
disruptions and fears combined to create an environment of apprehension and social 
instability. The violence just noted was considered the possible precursor to conflict 
during the first direct election for NTB governor. This situation necessitated the 
development of a conflict avoidance strategy by the provincial government. The next 
section considers one of the key players in the conflict-management plans—Tuan Guru 
and their organizations.
Religious Leadership, Ritual, and Affiliation
The Sasak are obedient to Tuan Guru. They are too scared to ignore them. 
— Ustadz Kamarudin, Pagutan, Mataram52
Tuan Guru and their religious organizations are critical to any analysis of socio­
political affairs and conflict management in contemporary Lombok. This section will 
examine their high social standing and how they leverage their socio-political 
authority and institutional strength to avoid or resolve communal conflict. Tuan Gurus' 
role as social mediators informs the manner of, and rationale for, their participation in 
the provincial authority's conflict-management strategy for the 2008 elections.
Knowing who these religious leaders are and what they do provides the necessary 
context to understanding their socio-political power and authority in Lombok. On a
48 For a discussion of the fearful and strained environment on Lombok during this period, see Stein 
Kristiansen, "Violent Youth Groups in Indonesia: The Cases of Yogyakarta and Nusa Tenggara Barat," 
Sojourn 18,2 (2003): 110-38.
49 See Joshua Barker, "State of Fear: Controlling the Criminal Contagion in Suharto's New Order," in 
Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia, ed. Benedict Anderson (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Southeast 
Asia Program Publications, 2001), pp. 26-28; and Stein Kristiansen and Lembang Trijono, "Authority and 
Law Enforcement: Local Government Reforms and Security Systems in Indonesia," Contemporary Southeast 
Asia 27,2 (2005): 238-41.
50 This was the key period of pamswakarsa anti-crime activities, although these groups are still operational 
and remain an important aspect of security arrangements on the island.
51 For further discussion of pamswakarsa and their lawlessness, see the section "Are Tuan Guru Peacemakers 
or Peace-breakers?" below.
v  Ustadz Kamarudin's assessment encapsulates a commonly held opinion about the degree and nature of 
Sasak obedience to Tuan Guru. Author's field notes, February 22, 2011.
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basic level, Tuan Guru are akin to both Muslim religious teachers (ustadz) and leaders 
(ulama).53 Among Lombok's largely pious Muslim population, Tuan Guru are pivotal 
socio-religious figures.53 4 Yet, they are not a homogenous group, but rather hold a 
diversity of theological positions, political affiliations, and varying levels of influence.55 
The common denominator underpinning their role in conflict-management processes 
is the ability of Tuan Guru to act as respected mediators with the capacity to ease social 
tensions or resolve altercations.56
Tuan Gurus' authority is multifaceted, and they are active as spiritual, community, 
and political leaders. As politically active religious teachers, they reflect Islamic 
jurisprudential traditions that see religion and state as intricately connected.57 Richard 
Antoun expressed this political configuration lucidly, "for Muslims, the community 
(umma) is simultaneously a religious and a political community under a single 
jurisdiction headed by God."58
These religious leaders are influential, and their socio-political status, so essential 
to their role as agents in conflict management, springs from their religious credentials. 
The authority of Tuan Guru is not derived from any official title, but rather from Sasak 
acceptance of their leadership.59 This endorsement results from their religious 
knowledge, personal charisma, and institutional backing. Many scholars and social 
commentators have observed the profound nature of the leadership role that Tuan 
Guru possess. Sven Cederroth has asserted that among the Sasak, a " Tuan Guru is 
regarded as a person above ordinary human beings. He is close to Allah, and because 
of this cannot do anything wrong,"60 while Judith Ecklund described them as having a
53 Tuan Guru hold a similar role and function as do Kiyai in Java. See Sven Cederroth, The Spell o f the 
Ancestors and the Power ofMekkah: A Sasak Community on Lombok (Gothenburg: Acta Universitatis 
Gothoburgensis, 1981), pp. 81-88; E. Turmudi, Perselingkuhan Kyai Dengan Kekuasaan (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 
2004); and M. Cameron Hay, "Women Standing between Life and Death: Fate, Agency, and the Healers of 
Lombok," in The Agency of Women in Asia, ed. Lyn Parker (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2005), 
pp. 28-29.
54 See Cederroth, The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power ofMekkah; Bartholomew Ryan, "Alif Lam Mim: 
Reconci I i ng Islam, Modernity, and Tradition in an Indonesian Kampung" (PhD dissertation, Harvard 
University, 1999); E. Budiwanti, Islam Sasak: Waktu Telu Versus Waktu Lima (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2000); and 
Avonius, Reforming Wetu Telu.
55 Interview with Tuan Guru Hajji (TGH) Subkhi Sasaki, in Kediri, West Lombok, August 23, 200S.
56 Interview with Muhammad Dimiati, in Mataram, August 12, 2008. See also Kingsley, Democracy, Conflict, 
and Islamic Leadership in Eastern Indonesia.
57 The complexity of the intersection between these leaders' religious responsibilities and their political 
activities, to a large degree, relates to the role and definition of Syari'ah (Islamic law) within state function, 
and, therefore, to the appropriate role of religious leadership within state affairs. See Abdullahi Ahmed 
An-Na'im, "Shari'a in the Secular State: A Paradox of Separation and Conflation," in The Law Applied: 
Contextualizing the Islamic Shari'a, ed. Peri Bearman, Wolfhart Heinrichs, and Bernard G. Weiss (New York, 
NY: I. B. Tauris, 2008), pp. 321-41; Robin Bush, Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power Within Islam and 
Politics in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 8-16. When ulama (Muslim 
religious leaders) move from a focus on spiritual leadership to activity within the political realm, many 
risks emerge, as discussed in Gregory J. Fealy, "Ulama and Politics in Indonesia: A History of Nahdlatul 
Ulama, 1952-1967" (PhD dissertation, Monash University, 1998), p. 110.
58 Richard T. Antoun, Muslim Preacher in the Modern World: A Jordanian Case Study in Comparative Perspective 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 227.
59 Sabirin, "Respon Pemikiran Tuan Guru Terhadap Penetrasi Ajaran Wahabi Pada Etnik Sasak di Pulau 
Lombok" (Master's thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2008), pp. 44-50.
60 Sven Cederroth, "Traditional Power and Party Politics in North Lombok, 1965-99," in Elections in 
Indonesia: The New Order and Beyond, ed. Hans Antlov and Sven Cederroth (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 80.
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"cult-like" status.61 Tuan Gurus' social authority has long been considered more potent 
in Lombok than the authority of government leadership.62 The partnership between 
government and religious actors in conflict management thus allows for government 
policy to be effective in ways that would be otherwise unattainable.63 64
The authority of Tuan Guru is not just felt in the mosque, but has tangible effects 
across the island. Political leaders on the island are, for instance, well aware of the 
powerful role of Tuan Guru. I personally witnessed two Golkar members of the 
provincial legislature, both men of high social standing, waiting for over an hour to 
receive advice from an influential Tuan Guru.64 Due to Tuan Gurus' high social 
standing, it is almost impossible to make social policy or gain public support for an 
initiative in Lombok without the active (or at least tacit) support of these leaders. A 
women's legal aid organization, LBH-APIK NTB,65 has recognized the importance of 
working with Tuan Guru and has appointed a specific religious liaison office to 
mediate between their organization and these influential leaders. This makes NTB the 
only Indonesian province where LBH-APIK has a dedicated staff member responsible 
for fostering relationships with ulama, an organizational strategy that attests to the 
powerful, and arguably unique, role of these local religious leaders.66
In order to contextualize the social status of Tuan Guru, it is necessary to explore 
religion and piety within Lombok's cultural mores.67 Lombok is known locally as the 
"island of a thousand mosques," but since there are well over three thousand mosques 
on the island, this slogan is clearly an understatement.68 Needless to say, the 
ubiquitous nature of mosques symbolizes the importance of Islam for the Sasak.69 Islam
61 Judith L. Ecklund, "Tradition or Non-tradition: Adat, Islam, and Local Control on Lombok," in What is 
Modern Indonesian Culture?, ed. Gloria Davis (Athens, OH: Ohio University, Center for International 
Studies, 1979), p. 253.
62 "Intlasi Tuan Guru," Tempo, July 10,1976.
63 In the current political environment, Tuan Guru, who have, until recently, been largely non-state actors, 
are now using their socio-political authority to become elected officials. This was clearly illustrated when 
TGH Bajang, the religious head of the local Islamic mass movement Nahdlatul Wathan Pancor, was 
elected NTB Governor in the 2008 elections. Therefore, the categorization into "state" and "non-state" 
actors or activities used in this article has become blurred in recent years, as Tuan Guru have become 
actively involved in provincial and local politics. Despite this, I have found that the dichotomy of "state" 
and "non-state" remains a useful descriptive typology for understanding socio-political affairs in Lombok, 
even if the constituent elements are sometimes blurred and overlap at their edges.
64 Author's field notes, July 20, 2008.
65 Lembaga Bantuan Hukum—Asosiasi Perempuan Indonesia Untuk Keadilan (Legal Aid Institute— 
Indonesian Women's Association for Justice) is a national organization with branches in fourteen 
provinces.
66 Author's field notes, August 11, 2008.
67 The prominent role of Tuan Guru on the island has been acknowledged in popular culture, as they have 
been featured as central characters in fictional accounts of life on the island. See, for instance, S. Faris, Tuan 
Guru (Yogyakarta: Genta Press, 2007).
68 Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi NTB, Nusa Tenggara Bar at Dalam Angka 2 010, p. 155.
69 Religious affiliation and ritual play a significant role in the life of members of other religious groups in 
Mataram and West Lombok, but this article focuses on the majority Sasak community. Additionally, 
although I often refer to "the Sasak" as being Muslim, there are small minorities, such as the Sasak Buda, 
that are not Muslim, and other minority Sasak groups that practice syncretic derivations of Islam, such as 
the Wetu Telu. See Budiwanti, Islam Sasak: Waktu Telu versus Waktu Lima; Avonius, Reforming Wetu Telu; 
and MacDougall, "Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists?"
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is one of the primary forms of social organization and discourse in Lombok,70 with 
Tuan Guru acting like a "social glue."71 TGH Sofwan Hakim, one of Lombok's most 
senior religious leaders, echoed these sentiments, emphasizing that Islam was at the 
core of life for the vast majority of Sasak.72 Edward Aspinall has highlighted the 
Acehnese perception that, for the Acehnese, "Islam and Aceh are two sides of the same 
coin."73 Replace "Aceh" with "Lombok" or "Sasak" in this quote, and it would 
adequately reflect the centrality of Islam to Lombok's Muslim population.
The centrality of religious life is one of the major reasons that Tuan Guru wield 
considerable authority in their communities. Through their Islamic teaching in 
pengajian (religious education classes) and khutbah (Friday sermons), they develop the 
loyalty of santri (religious students/followers).74 Tuan Guru also exercise influence 
through the provision otfatwa, which are non-binding socio-religious opinions made in 
response to questions asked by members of their community.75 76This jurisprudential 
role as/afaw-maker provides Tuan Guru with social leverage and influence on people's 
daily lives and extends to them the role of guardians of local religious practice and 
interpretation.0
The authority that contemporary Tuan Guru exert needs to be analyzed within a 
historical perspective. Since the late 1800s, Tuan Guru in Lombok have progressively 
overtaken the bangsawan (Sasak nobility) as the leading non-state actors on the island.77 
During the Dutch colonial period in Lombok, Tuan Guru operated outside Dutch 
colonial structures and established alternative institutional and social networks that 
remain active today.78 At the same time, their noble rivals were part of the colonial 
governance structures.79 In recent times, the role of the Tuan Guru has only continued
70 L. R. Bennett, Women, Islam and Modernity: Single Women, Sexuality, and Reproductive Health in 
Contemporary Indonesia (New York, NY: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005) p. 13.
71 Interview with Lalu Nurtaat, in Mataram, July 28, 200S.
72 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim, in Kediri, West Lombok, August 13, 2008.
73 E. Aspinall, Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press 2009), p. 10.
74 "Inflasi Tuan Guru," Tempo, July 10,1976; M. Noor, M. Habib, and M. H. Zuhdi, Visi kebangsaan TGH 
Zainudin Abdtd Madjid (Jakarta: PT Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2004). This issue was also discussed in several 
interviews, such as with TGH Sofwan Hakim and TGH Munajid Khalid. Interview with TGH Sofwan 
Hakim, in Kediri, West Lombok, August 13, 2008. Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid, in Gunung Sari, 
West Lombok, August 24, 2008.
75 Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick, and David S. Powers, "Muftis, Fatwas, and Islamic Legal 
Interpretation," in Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and their Fatwas, ed. Muhammad Khalid Masud, 
Brinkley Messick, and David S. Powers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 3.
76 The importance of this function for Indonesian ulama is discussed in R. Michael Feener, Muslim Legal 
Thought in Modern Indonesia (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 151.
" Judith L. Ecklund, "Marriage, Seaworms, and Song: Ritualized Responses to Cultural Change in Sasak 
Life" (PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 1977), p. 9. Similar dynamics were also seen in Java during the 
colonial period, during which rivalry often arose between religious leaders and the nobility. See M. C. 
Ricklefs, "Religion, Politics, and Social Dynamics in Java: Historical and Contemporary Rhymes," in 
Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia, ed. Greg Fealy and Sally White (Singapore: Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), p. 118. For a discussion of one of the earliest religious players in this 
competition, see Salman Faris, Guru Dane (Lombok: STKIP Hamzanwadi Press, 2011).
78 Asnawi, "Islam dan Visi Kebangsaan di Nusa Tenggara Barat," in Menjadi Indonesia: 13 Abad Eksistensi 
Islam di Bumi Nusantara, ed. Komaruddin Hidayat and Ahmad Gauf (Jakarta: Mizan, 2006), p. 327.
79 Kari Telle, "Spirited Places and Ritual Dynamics among Sasak Muslims on Lombok," Anthropological 
Forum 19,3 (2009): 292.
Peacemakers or Peace-breakers? 65
to grow, while the bangsawan have seen their socio-political influence eroded.80 This 
means that Tuan Gurus are almost unquestionably the most dominant leaders on the 
island, and therefore, were essential to the conflict-management strategy for the 2008 
elections.
Religious knowledge, charisma, and political savvy were important in the rise of 
Tuan Guru, but their dominant socio-political role was fostered most effectively by 
their practical activities, such as the provision of welfare services. The management of 
food stocks during cyclical drought periods allowed Tuan Guru and their organizations 
to provide sustenance via rationing to their community.81 When discussing famines in 
Lombok, it is essential to understand the serious and cyclical nature of these events.82 
For instance, in 1883 a famine that affected Bali, Lombok, and Sumbawa saw an 
estimated 117,000 people die.83 Droughts and food shortages have historically occurred 
every two to three years on the island, leading to "starvation due to crop failure."84 The 
last major famine in Lombok occurred during 1966, when approximately 10,000 people 
died (the starvation was concentrated in southern Lombok).85 Conditions have 
improved in recent times, but the World Food Programme still manages several food 
distribution programs across the island.86
A Tuan Guru's influence is often reinforced by an institutional infrastructure, often 
elaborate, that generates strong mechanisms for allegiance and sources of patronage. 
Organizational networks include pondok pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), groups 
that provide social services (such as medical clinics), and businesses (including stores, 
catering services, and "savings and loans" providers).87 These spiritual and practical 
activities have reinforced the powerful role of the Tuan Guru, and it is reasonable to 
suggest that the institutional network they have created is akin to a para-state, as their 
religious organizations' activities replicate many state functions—undertaking services 
including health, education, and security.88
80 The expanding role and authority of Tuan Guru and the rationale for the increase in their power have 
been covered in Cederroth, The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power ofMekkah, pp. 276-84; Budiwanti, Islam 
Sasak Wetu Lima versus Waktu Lima, pp. 119-21; Noor et al., Visi Kebangsaan Religius, pp. 108-11; Masnun, 
Tuan Guru KHMuhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid: Gagasan dan Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam di Nusa 
Tenggara Barat (Mataram: Pustaka Al-Miqdad, 2007); Sabirin, "Respon Pemikiran Tuan Guru," pp. 17-24, 
44-47. A comprehensive historical analysis of the rise of Tuan Guru is covered in Jeremy Kingsley, "Tuan 
Guru, Community and Conflict in Lombok, Indonesia," pp. 94-97.
81 See A. van der Kraan, Lombok: Conquest, Colonization, and Underdevelopment, 1870-1940 (Singapore: 
Heinemann Educational Books, 1980), p. 173; Cederroth, The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power ofMekkah, 
pp. 276-84; Sabirin, "Respon Pemikiran Tuan Guru," pp. 17-24, 44-47.
82 Cederroth, The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power ofMekkah, p. 284.
83 M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200 (Basingstoke: Palgrave: 2001), p. 173.
84 Mary Poo-Mooi Judd, "The Sociology of Rural Poverty in Lombok, Indonesia" (PhD dissertation, 
University of California, Berkeley, 1980), pp. 10,18.
85 Kari Telle, "Spirited Places and Ritual Dynamics among Sasak Muslims on Lombok," p. 298.
86 Indonesia (2010), World Food Programme, at http: / / www.wfp.org/ countries/ indonesia, accessed 
February 2, 2012. This improvement remains tentative and incomplete, as exemplified by the tragic death 
of two children who starved in East Lombok during 2011. See Panca Nugraha, "Two Die as Malnutrition 
Continues to Ravage NTB," The Jakarta Post, May 23, 2011, at http: / / www.thejakartapost.com/
news/ 2011 / 05/ 23/ two-die-malnutrition-continues-ravage-ntb.html
87 Interview with TGF1 Sofwan Flakim, in Kediri, West Lombok, August 13, 2008.
88 Jeremy Kingsley, "Tuan Guru, Community, and Conflict in Lombok, Indonesia," p. 94.
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Are Tuan Guru Peacemakers or Peace-breakers?
In this article, I emphasize the positive role Tuan Guru play in maintaining social 
harmony, but these religious leaders can also be peace-breakers, causing social havoc 
and violence. This section examines these two divergent roles and outlines the care 
with which the parties to conflict management should be enlisted and used. This 
discussion provides background to the nuanced nature of the conflict-management 
strategy that the provincial government adopted for the 2008 elections. It also acts as a 
cautionary note for other provincial and government institutions in Indonesia seeking 
to partner with non-state actors for conflict management.
The provincial authority's election strategy recognized not only the importance of 
Tuan Guru, but also one of their key political motivations—the desire to protect their 
own social standing. Tuan Guru have a vested interest in maintaining social stability, as 
violence has the potential to destabilize their authority. If a situation gets out of 
control, the prestige (and, consequently, the influence) of a Tuan Guru could be 
jeopardized due to perceptions that he and his fellow leaders cannot control their 
community. Given their strength in religious and socio-political affairs in Lombok, 
their desire to maintain the peace is significant.
The real politik interests of Tuan Guru in avoiding and resolving conflict are coupled 
with theological imperatives to act "peacefully" and disallow "anarchy."89 For instance, 
when interviewed, many Tuan Guru said that the rioters' behavior during the January 
2000 disturbances was agai nst the teachings of Islam, which dictate to Muslims that the 
need to strive to be "good" is at the core of their religion's belief.90 Several Tuan Guru 
explained that this religious lesson was not just an intellectual exercise, but for many it 
was the key element of faith guiding them in their role as communal leaders.91
Tuan Guru's role in conflict management is not limited to religious sermons or 
classes, as many Tuan Guru told me that, in times of trouble, they would take direct 
action, such as instructing their followers over their mosque's loud speakers to cease 
involvement with violence; such interventions proved decisive even during the 
island's most serious tensions and violence. The January 2000 riots comprised five days 
of social disorder and violence. Many people in Lombok feel that these days remain a 
stain on the island's good name and have led to a keliilangan muka (loss of face).92 This 
embarrassment was clear when I spoke with TGH Sofwan Hakim, who felt that youths 
involved in the disorder had disregarded the lessons of Islam. They were, Hakim said, 
blindly following their emotions and being "anarchic."93
To understand the complex and confused way that the situation in January 2000 
unfolded for many Tuan Guru, and the manner in which they tried to regain control
89 The Islamic teachings underpinning these notions are discussed in the next section of this article.
90 For an in-depth account of this area of Islamic theology, see Michael Cook, Commanding Right and 
Forbidding Wrong (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
91 This idea was directly (and emotionally) described to me in several interviews, such as with TGH 
Mustiadi Abhar, TGH Subkhi Sasaki, and TGH Munajid Khalid.
92 "Kerusuhan Mataram, Keluguan Pemuda Yang Membawa Petaka," Lombok Post, February 22, 2000, p. I.
93 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim, in Kediri, West Lombok, August 13, 2008.
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over their community, it is worth mentioning an experience described by TGH Sofwan 
Hakim. He told me how he and many of his students had gone to a tabligh akbar 
(solidarity rally) to show support for their Muslim brothers and sisters suffering in 
Ambon on January 17, 2000.94 On this emotional day, Hakim noticed that some people 
on the periphery of the large ceremony were becoming feverish with excitement, as 
provocateurs stirred up the crowd. At this point, he did not realize the amount of 
anger that was building in the crowd or that this anger was about to explode into five 
days of riots.95
The true scope of the problems that were developing that day only dawned on 
Hakim when he returned home and found his students waiting for him. They wanted 
permission to participate in the riots. He sat with them and sought to calm their 
emotions. Sensing the anger expressed by his santri, he decided to issue an instruction 
(printah) to his larger community, making it clear that he did not approve of anyone 
participating in the violence. Hakim then deployed his students, instructing them to 
spread out across his hometown of Kediri, West Lombok, to communicate his message. 
They were to convey his theological explanation of why Muslims should not 
participate in the riots, and with this message came an implicit threat from Hakim: 
those partaking in the violence would be disappointing him and acting contrary to 
their religious obligations. People knew that Hakim's threat came with serious 
community sanctions if ignored.96 One of the most serious punishments that a Tuan 
Guru could issue, according to TGH Humaidi Zaen97 (and many other people with 
whom I spoke to informally), was the threat to ostracize a person from the community 
and thereby exclude him or her from communal life. In Sasak society, high levels of 
poverty necessitate the need to rely on friends and family as a "social safety net." 
Therefore, an individual's removal from his or her community has significant 
ramifications, as was seen in the Mataram community known as Kampung Lorn.98
Members of this kampung (urban village) rioted in January 2000. They were then 
detained by their community leaders upon returning from the unrest in a building at 
the edge of the kampung and not allowed out until the events had ended. Over a 
decade later, the rioters still live in the area but are still not allowed to attend 
community events and celebrations, such as weddings, or to sit under the berugaq 
(Sasak pavilion) in the main parts of Kampung Lorn. The effect of this latter prohibition 
means that they cannot attend their community's nightly informal gatherings.
94 Some people in Lombok have suggested the riots were spontaneous, but this is unlikely. There is 
significant evidence to suggest this violence was pre-planned. For instance, it was alleged that, in the 
preceding six months before the rally, radical elements had distributed emotive videos calling for Muslim 
solidarity in response to the conflict in Maluku. To generate these primal and emotional responses, the 
videos drew upon the graphic imagery of dead Muslim women and children in Ambon. See John M. 
MacDougall, "Criminality and the Political Economy of Security in Lombok," p. 299. Additionally, senior 
political figures have noted that money was distributed to reward people for participating in the riots, 
another indication that the disturbance was planned. Interview with Lalu Serinata, Mataram, January 8, 
2008.
95 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim, in Kediri, West Lombok, August 13, 2008.
96 Ibid.
17 TGH Humaidi Zaen, in Memben, East Lombok, August 9, 2008.
98 Kampung Lorn is a pseudonym used to protect the anonymity of one of the areas where I undertook 
research. I adopt the pseudonym here in compliance with the University of Melbourne Ethics Committee, 
which approved this project during 2007-08.
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Consequently, they miss out on discussions of job opportunities and community 
decision-making, which serves further to exacerbate and perpetuate their social and 
economic exclusion. In short, the social stigma attached to their participation in the 
riots remained strong nearly a decade after these events.
The printah (instructions) of a Tuan Guru are perceived by many Sasak to constitute 
religious obligations, which believers are obliged to follow. Hakim's clear assertion 
that people should not participate in the riots was not just a statement backed with 
social sanctions, but it also had a religious resonance, because there is a strong belief in 
the community that individuals must behave properly and that proper behavior is 
defined in accordance with Islam's injunctions, as interpreted and communicated by 
Tuan Guru. If persons fail to adhere to these religious teachings, many Sasak believe 
that they will not be accepted into heaven, so that punishment is not confined to the 
earthly realm but also extends into the afterlife." Sasak religious fatalism thus binds 
many people to follow their religious leaders obediently and shores up Tuan Gurus' 
powerful authority in the community.11
After the 2000 riots, a number of Tuan Guru sought to recompense victims of the 
violence for what had occurred. They saw it as essential not just to show their 
authority over their communities, but also actively to restore harmony and peace to 
their emotionally damaged island. As part of the reconciliation process, several Tuan 
Guru made visits to Surabaya and Bali in order to persuade those who had fled to 
return, promising them that Lombok was once again safe.9 1001
These examples highlight the role of Tuan Guru as peacemakers, but in the 
remainder of this section I will evaluate their potential as peace-breakers, for one 
cannot praise the Tuan Guru's role in conflict management without adding some 
caveats. For example, Erni Budiwanti has suggested that some Tuan Guru deliberately 
provoked their communities during episodes of violence against Ahmadiyah,102 a 
minority Muslim group, which was deemed a "deviant" sect according to Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Council of Indonesian Ulamas)—a quasi-state, fatwa- 
generating body.103 In response to a series of MUI fatwa, people in Lombok, and 
elsewhere in Indonesia, rioted at Ahmadiyah's places of worship and residences.104 The 
aggression in Lombok against Ahmadiyah would best be described as a slow "reign of 
terror," as incidents occurred sporadically over a lengthy period, between 1998 and
99 Sven Cederroth, "From Ancestor Worship to Monotheism; Politics of Religion in Lombok," Temenos 32 
(1996): 7; Bartholomew Ryan, "AlifLam Mini. Reconciling Islam, Modernity, and Tradition in an 
Indonesian Kampung" (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1999), pp. 139-43.
100 For a discussion of Sasak religious practices and the fatalism implicit in them, see Asnawi, Agama dan 
Paradigma Sosial Masyarakat (Jakarta: Sentra Media, 2006); and Asnawi, "Islam dan Visi Kebangsaan di 
Nusa Tenggara Barat." For a discussion of the impact of fatalism in the contemporary social environment 
of Lombok, particularly for women, see Maria Platt, "Patriarchal Institutions and Women's Agency in 
Indonesian Marriages: Sasak Women Navigating Dynamic Marital Continuums" (PhD dissertation, La 
Trobe University, 2010), pp. 52, 61.
101 "Masyarakat Bersatu Amankan Lingkungan," Lombok Post, February 14, 2000, p. I.
102 Erni Budiwanti, "Pluralism Collapses: A Study of the Jema'ah Ahmadiyah Indonesia and its 
Persecution," ARI Working Paper No. 117, National University of Singapore, May 2009.
103 MUI issued several fatwa between 1980 and 2005 to this effect. See ibid., pp. 13-1A
104 "Tak ada Pengamanan Khasus Untuk Jemaat Ahmadiyah," Lombok Post, April 30, 2008, p. 1; and 
"Tangani Ahmadiyah, Pemprov Tunggu Regulasi Pusat," Lombok Post, April 30, 2008, p. 9.
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2006.105 The violence varied in nature and severity, but the uniform aim of the attacks 
appears to have been the removal of Ahmadiyah members from the local community. 
Budiwanti has asserted that some Tuan Guru used inflammatory language during 
"sermons and preaching" to spur their followers into violent action.106
An alternative reading of the behavior of Tuan Guru during these episodes of 
violence came from H. Muhammad Dimiati, the young leader of a religious school in 
Pagutan, Mataram. He told me that Tuan Guru had to select their words, as well as 
their omissions, carefully in sermons and religious education classes due to their 
powerful ability to influence their followers. Consequently, great care was necessary 
when addressing their iimma (community), especially on sensitive issues such as 
Ahmadiyah. Dimiati was not aware of any Tuan Guru who had deliberately been 
provocative, although he said it was possible that a Tuan Guru who was not sufficiently 
cautious might provoke violence, for the followers of such a leader could interpret his 
statements as tacit expressions of approval licensing aggression towards this group.107 
Sabirin, another scholar from Lombok, concurred with Dimiati, claiming that Tuan 
Guru must act with great sensitivity in relation to minority Muslim groups because of 
the propensity for Sasak to behave negatively towards them.108 Dimiati and Budiwanti 
are reliable sources, and although they read these violent events differently, they both 
point to the ease with which Tuan Guru can sway the actions of their followers. Both, 
therefore, acknowledge the ability of Tuan Guru to be either peacemakers or peace- 
breakers. The reality is that a Tuan Guru can be a peace-breaker through direct 
instructions, insinuations, or simply through an imprudent choice of words.
The potential for Tuan Guru to act as peace-breakers, rather than peacemakers, is 
also demonstrated by their interactions with Lombok's pamsivakarsa (private militia). 
These groups were initially founded as the result of a community-based response to 
the perceived crime wave in the late 1990s and the early part of this century, during a 
time when people believed that the police were ineffective, and, as a result, organized 
themselves to protect their communities. However, these original good intentions have 
been obscured by a plethora of reports that pamsivakarsa have acted in a lawless and 
violent manner. The actions they took to stop crime quickly shifted and escalated to 
more questionable behavior. Yet all Sasak pamsivakarsa have links to Tuan Guru. For 
instance, TGH Bajang,109 the current NTB governor, is the head of Satgas (Satuan 
Tugas, taskforce), a militia controlled by Nahdlatul Wathan (NW), in Pancor.110The
105 There are reports of violence against Ahmadiyah members that took place in a number of locations 
across the island: in the Keruak district, East Lombok, in 1998; Bayan, North Lombok, in 2001; Pancor, 
Medas, Sukamulya, and Sembalun, in East Lombok, during 2002; Ketapang, West Lombok, in 2005; and 
then Praya, Central Lombok, in 2006. See Institut Agama Islam Negeri Mataram (IAIN) Mediation Center, 
Social Conflicts in Lombok (internal document, 2006).
106 Erni Budiwanti, "Pluralism Collapses," p. 17.
107 Interview with Muhammad Dimiati, in Mataram, August 12, 2008.
108 Sabirin, "Respon Pemikiran Tuan Guru," pp. 2-3.
109 TGH Bajang's full name is TGH M. Zainul Majdi.
110 Nahdlatul Wathan Pancor is a Lombok-based traditionalist mass movement. It shares a similar 
theological perspective with the national mass movement Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). "Pancor" refers to the 
town in East Lombok where this group is based. There is a rival NW organization based in another East 
Lombok town, Anjani. The dispute between these two organizations is discussed in "TGH Serukan NW 
Pancor-Anjani Bersatu," Lombok Post, August 11, 2008, p. 9; Saipul Hamdi, "Reconciling Muslim Conflict in 
Nahdlatul Wathan in Lombok, Eastern Indonesia," paper presented at the Fourth Asian Graduate Forum
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pamswakarsa Amphibi is controlled by TGH Sibaway,111 and Hizbullah by TGH 
Zainuddin Abdul Madjid.112
These militia groups are so large that they now can pose a direct challenge to law 
enforcement, and, more generally, social harmony. While some people have argued 
that Lombok's militias have decreased in significance, Amphibi reported in 2007 that 
its membership had actually grown to over 350,000 (approximately 10 percent of 
Lombok's population).113 This is probably an exaggeration, but Amphibi remains a 
large group that is still relatively active in Mataram.114
This issue of militia activities in Lombok has real consequences, as the members of 
such groups often figure at the heart of social turmoil and violence.115 For instance, in 
mid-December 1999, over forty trucks transported an estimated two thousand 
Amphibi members from East Lombok to a Hindu part of Kuranji village, West 
Lombok, searching for an alleged thief.116 The raid on the village resulted in the death 
of one villager and the serious injury of another.117 To cap off this inglorious event, one 
of the hands of the alleged thief, I Gusti Ngurah, was amputated. As the trucks headed 
back to eastern Lombok, they passed by the Beretais Market,118 where the convoy took 
a victory lap, with one of the riders "waving the severed hand."119 There is no evidence 
or reports of any of those involved in the Kuranji incident ever being prosecuted for 
the death or injuries emerging out of the raid.
More recently, in mid-August 2007, Amphibi members raided a police station in 
Sekotong, Central Lombok, where a police officer was kidnapped and badly beaten.
on Southeast Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, Singapore, July 2009; and Kevin W. Fogg 
and Muhammad Saleh Ending, "One Islamic Community, Two Rival Sisters," Inside Indonesia (2011), at 
http: / / www.insideindonesia.org/ weekly-articles-103-jan-mar-2011 / one-islamic-community-two-rival- 
sisters-17121928.
111 MacDougall, "Self-reliant Militias," Inside Indonesia (2003), at http: / / www.insideindonesia.org/edition- 
73-jan-mar-2003/self-reliant-militias-2907337.
112 "Hizbullah NW Blog," Nahdlatul Wathan Anjani, accessed January 17, 2011, at http: / / hizbullah- 
nw.blogspot.com/.
113 "Anggota Pam Swakarsa Amphibi Banjiri Kota Praya," Lombok Post, August 6, 2007, p. 9.
114 See interview with Subuh, Mataram, November 6, 2007; interview with Saonah, Mataram, November 7, 
2007; interview with Ciman, Mataram, November 8, 2007; interview with Jupri, Mataram, November 9, 
2007; interview with Mukhlis, Mataram, November 10, 2007; interview with Sahari, Mataram, November 
11, 2007; and interview with Tumi, Mataram, November 12, 2007.1 have used pseudonyms to protect the 
identities of the members of the organizations discussed here and the community in which I conducted 
my research.
115 The Perils of Private Security Groups in Indonesia: Guards and Militias on Bali and Lombok, International 
Crisis Group (2003), at http: / / www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/067-the- 
perils-of-private-security-in-indonesia-guards-and-militias-on-bali-and-lombok.aspx; MacDougall, "Self- 
reliant Militias"; John M. MacDougall, "Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists?," pp. 252-62. Groups of this 
size are capable of directly challenging the authority of the police in Lombok. See Stein Kristiansen, 
"Violent Youth Groups in Indonesia: The Cases of Yogyakarta and Nusa Tenggara Barat," Sojourn 18,2 
(2003): 110-38.
116 "Kelompok Massa Hakimi Warga Kuranji," Lombok Post, December 18,1999, p. 1.
117 "Amphibi Minta Maaf dan Sepakat Kerjasama," Lombok Post, December 31,1999, p. 1.
118 Beretais Market is Mataram's largest market and a transport hub for goods being transported to and 
from Lombok. Interestingly, Amphibi now has the security contract for this commercial facility.
119 MacDougall, "Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists?," pp. 260-61; MacDougall, "Criminality and the 
Political Economy of Security in Lombok"," pp. 297-98. This story was also confirmed by a participant in 
my research who lives close to the Beretais Market. Interview with Zaini, Mataram, July 16, 2008.
Peacemakers or Peace-breakers? 71
The reason this kidnapping occurred is unclear. The challenge to state authority in this 
vicious attack led an obviously shaken senior provincial government official to tell me 
angrily that "they [militia members] do not respect the law, they do not respect the 
police, and they do not respect the state."'2"This reaction highlighted the serious 
nature of the challenge that pamswakarsa present. These two examples raise the 
question of why Tuan Guru endorse and lead these groups, given the fact that their 
members are often violent thugs.
Issues in Lombok, however, are rarely simple. One of the major accomplishments 
of those working on preparations for the 2008 gubernatorial elections was to ensure 
that pamswakarsa were nowhere to be seen during the campaign or on election day. 
Several informants from the campaign teams said certain politicians and Tuan Guru 
who were closely connected to these pamswakarsa made sure that the militia members 
remained out of sight and that they did not become entangled in clashes between rival 
political groups.120 21 Therefore, one of the key threats to social harmony during the 2008 
elections was removed through the intervention of these leaders, highlighting once 
again Tuan Gurus' potential role as both peacemakers and peace-breakers.
Lombok's religious groups and the militia organizations affiliated with them have 
been peace-breakers in the past. These groups were directly implicated in violence 
during 1965-66, when Indonesia was undergoing a transfer of power from President 
Soekarno to President Suharto. During this period, an estimated 100,000 to two million 
people were killed during efforts to eliminate activists or sympathizers of the 
Indonesian Communist Party, PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia).122 Lombok was not 
immune to the madness; according to Robert Cribb, "local memories report fifty 
thousand killings in early 1966."123The bloodshed that spread across the archipelago 
was undertaken not just by the military, but was also, in part, facilitated by the youth 
wings of Lombok's main religious organizations124—Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and NW— 
rounding up alleged communists.125 It is not known if this involvement was 
encouraged by Tuan Guru, but it would be reasonable to assume their tacit support of 
these activities, at the very least.
120 Information from a meeting with a provincial government official in Mataram during August 2007. The 
participant will remain anonymous.
121 It is worth remembering that there were also close connections between two of the key political 
adversaries in the gubernatorial race and groups of pamswakarsa; Lalu Serinata was linked with Amphibi 
and TGH Bajang with Satgas.
122 Robert Cribb, "How Many Deaths? Problems in the Statistics of Massacre in Indonesia (1965-66) and 
East Timor (1975-80)," in Violence in Indonesia, ed. Ingrid Wessel and George Wimhofer (Hamburg: Abera, 
2001), p. 82; Annie Pohlman, "Women and the Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966: Gender Variables and 
Possible Directions for Research," paper presented at the Fifteenth Biennial Conference of the Asian 
Studies Association of Australia, Canberra, June 29-July 2, 2004, p. 2.
123 Robert Cribb, "Problems in the H istoriography of the Killings in Indonesia," in The Indonesian Killings of 
1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali, ed. Robert Cribb (Clayton, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 
Monash University, 1990), p. 25.
124 Christian, Catholic, and other religious groups were also involved in the anti-communist actions in 
Lombok. See Zakaria, Geger Gerakan 30 September 1965, p. 86. For a discussion of these groups more 
generally in relation to Indonesian religious organizations, see Greg Fealy and Katharine McGregor, 
"Nahdlatul Ulama and the Killings of 1965-66: Religion, Politics, and Remembrance," Indonesia 89 (April 
2010): 37-60.
125 Ibid., p. 55.
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In 1965-66, loathing of those associated with the PKI emerged from many elements 
of Indonesian society, as many felt that Communist Party activists and members had 
cut themselves off126 from traditional relationships, social structures, and community 
obligations.127 This meant that in Lombok, PKI activists were, in many ways, perceived 
to be a direct threat to the authority and social position of Tuan Guru. This raises the 
possibility that Tuan Guru may act in less than admirable ways when their interests are 
challenged.
To understand the role of Tuan Guru as peacemakers or peace-breakers, one must 
comprehend their socio-political interests. They are religious and political players 
whose influence in Lombok society is contingent upon circumstance. The fluid role 
taken on by Muslim religious leaders more broadly has been astutely explained by 
Muhammad Qasim Zaman, who noted that, for these leaders, "there is no single way 
of defending their ideals or making them practical or relevant in the world."128 129Tuan 
Guru are not ideal types; rather, they are leaders dealing with real world problems, 
who have their own interests and communities to protect (and control). The 
ambiguous role of Tuan Guru highlights the challenges involved in developing conflict- 
management strategies in Lombok. These strategies are not easy or straightforward to 
design. At the same time, once designed, they are not impossible to implement, as the 
case study in the next section highlights.
The NTB Gubernatorial Elections
The case study of the 2008 NTB gubernatorial elections will be outlined in the next 
three subsections. This examination considers the logistics of the conflict-management 
strategy, starting with the role of ethnicity within political contestation and the 
arrangements designed to prevent these tensions from becoming a poisonous issue. 
The following section will consider government and religious cooperation, after which 
the implementation of the strategy will be examined. The case study relies heavily 
upon Tuan Gurus' own explanations of how they envisage their role in maintaining 
social harmony, as well as their descriptions of the specific activities they undertook as 
part of the 2008 election strategy.124 All Tuan Guru interviewed were from Mataram or 
West Lombok, with the exception of TGH Humaidi Zaen, of East Lombok. In addition 
to discussing the role of Tuan Guru in the conflict-management strategy, I will also
126 PKI members challenged traditional social structures, and this was part of what made them vulnerable. 
See David Levine, "History and Social Structure in the Study of Contemporary Indonesia," Indonesia 7 
(April 1969): 8.
127 Many of those accused of being communists had merely challenged or would not conform to local 
power structures. See John Sidel, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad, pp. 28-48. According to Pipit Rochijat, "the slightest 
thing could get one accused of being a Communist." See Pipit Rochijat "Am I PKI or non-PKI?," trans. 
Benedict Anderson, Indonesia 40 (October 1985): 46. In essence, political and economic rivalries were being 
played out and opponents eliminated under the guise of capturing those alleged to be affiliated with the 
communist party.
128 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians o f Change (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 191.
129 The answers given by Tuan Guru are, to a degree, inevitably self-serving. It is likely that these religious 
leaders wanted to impress upon me (a foreign researcher) their positive socio-political role. Yet the 
teachings they spoke of to me during interviews were consistent with their teachings at pengajian (religious 
education classes). Their answers also reflected the ways I observed that they behaved in conflict 
situations. See Jeremy Kingsley, "Democracy, Conflict, and Islamic Leadership in Eastern Indonesia."
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explore their role during the January 2000 riots, for many of the Tuan Guru felt that 
their actions during these events reflected appropriate behavior for religious leaders 
when involving themselves in avoiding or resolving conflict.
Foreseeing a potential outbreak of election-related violence, the former governor 
Lalu Serinata delegated primary responsibility for preparing a conflict-management 
strategy to a team of provincial bureaucrats. This group was led by Ali,130 who was, at 
that time, a senior public servant in Kesbanglinmas NTB.131 Ali's regular duties 
included gathering intelligence on potential points of social tension and conflict in 
Lombok. A wall-sized map of Lombok and Sumbawa dominated his office, with 
markers pinpointing conflicts and social problems, coded according to their current 
status and level of seriousness. The intelligence he gathered was provided to provincial 
authorities so they could preempt escalation of these tensions.132 Ali's accumulated 
knowledge informed the development of the conflict-management strategy for the 
gubernatorial election.
Ethnic and Political Violence in Lombok
The primary issue causing apprehension within government ranks was 
competition between local politicians who represented two ethnic groups: the Sasak 
(from Lombok) and the Bimanese (from Sumbawa). Both of these groups are Muslim. 
Therefore, ethnic rivalries, rather than confrontations between cadres of different 
political parties or ideological issues, primarily exercised the minds of Ali's team 
preparing for the 2008 election.133
Normally, the Sasak and Bimanese who live in Mataram coexist peacefully. 
However, problems can arise during elections, when members of these two ethnic 
groups challenge each other for the political and economic rewards of public office.134 It 
is a commonly held perception in Lombok that the election of a Sasak or Bimanese 
politician to a senior post will give an advantage to his or her respective ethnic group, 
to the detriment of the other group. Citizens expect that Sasak and Bimanese leaders 
will give preference in the appointment of government jobs and potential business
130 "Ali" is a pseudonym used here to protect the identity of a participant in this research, who is a senior 
provincial government official.
131 "Kesbanglinmas" means "Kesatuan Bangsa dan Perlindungan Masyarakat" (Office of National Unity 
and Community Protection), essentially a local intelligence unit.
132 Ali's role in these efforts was pieced together through several informal discussions I had with him 
during 2007-08, and my lengthy interview with him in Mataram, November 13, 2007.
133 Edward Aspinall has argued that ethnicity is no longer a major feature in Indonesian electoral politics. 
He does not suggest that efhnicity is irrelevant, but rather that it is no longer a definitive political factor. 
There is significant merit in his arguments, but my findings in Lombok suggest that ethnicity still has a 
significant impact upon provincial politics there. See Edward Aspinall, "Democratization and the 
Weakening of Ethnic Politics in Indonesia," seminar, Indonesia Study Group, Australian National 
University, Canberra, June 30, 2010. Aspinall's argument was further refined in a recent article 
(coauthored with Sebastian Dettman and Eva Warburton) in which the authors explain that different 
factors, such as ethnicity or religion, have varying resonance depending upon the circumstances. I agree 
with this assessment. See Edward Aspinall, Sebastian Dettman, and Eva Warburton, "When Religion 
Trumps Ethnicity: A Regional Election Case Study from Indonesia," South East Asia Research 19,1 (2011): 
55-56.
134 The economic incentives for political competition and violence are discussed in International Crisis 
Group, "Indonesia: Preventing Violence in Local Elections," Asia Report No. 197, December 2010.
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opportunities to members of their own ethnic group.135 Tensions between these ethnic 
groups can also rise in Mataram during election periods due to the influx of campaign 
workers from other parts of Lombok and Sumbawa, amplifying the potential for 
conflict.
Over the decade preceding the 2008 elections, jockeying between local elites 
intensified as a result of political decentralization throughout Indonesia. The first signs 
of growing political competition in the region can be traced back to 1998, when Jakarta 
politicians decided to appoint Harun Al-Rasyid,136 a politician of Bimanese origin, as 
governor of NTB.137 Al-Rasyid was not considered a "local" politician, as he had not 
lived in the province for many years, and when he was nominated ahead of a locally 
active Sasak politician, Lalu Mudjitahid,138 the decision angered many within the Sasak 
political elite, although Al-Rasyid's appointment did not lead to any reports of 
violence. In fact, many considered Al-Rasyid's appointment an improvement on 
previous NTB governors who had been Javanese bureaucrats or senior military 
officers.139
Ethnic tensions and conflict arose again in 2003 with the election of the first Sasak 
and locally active politician, Lalu Serinata, to the position of NTB governor.140 
Serinata's promotion was not determined by officials in Jakarta, but rather by a vote of 
the provincial legislature. The election of Serinata caused clashes, as mentioned 
previously in this article, between his supporters and those endorsing Al-Rasyid. This 
conflict was essentially split down ethnic lines and led to an unknown number of 
casualties and injuries.141 Repeated outbreaks of ethnic tensions, as noted earlier, also 
occurred in connection with the election of a rektor (university president) at IKIP in 
2006. The fear was that, with the direct election of governor in the 2008 elections, these 
dormant tensions would be brought back to the surface.
Religion and Political Cooperation
The conflict-management strategy for the 2008 gubernatorial elections developed 
by Ali's team had three central elements. The first element was based on the
135 Concern about the apportionment of roles in the NTB public service and its impact on ethnic relations 
had been reported since early in the Reformasi period. See "Ada Kecemburuan Etnis Penempatan PNS," 
Lombok Post, December 19,1999, p. 9.
136 Harun Al-Rasyid was technically appointed by the NTB legislature; however, in 1999, this vote was a 
mere formality (as it would have been under Suharto during the New Order), confirming the will of 
Jakarta. For discussion of the New Order processes, see Choi, "Local Elections and Democracy in 
Indonesia: The Riau Archipelago," p. 330.
137 Sayuti and Langitan, Perjalanan Orang Sasak Menjadi Gubernur, p. 3.
138 Ibid., pp. 15-20; I Ketut Putra Erawan, "Tracing the Progress of Local Governments since 
Decentralisation," in Indonesia: Democracy and the Promise o f Good Governance, ed. Ross H. McLeod and 
Andrew MacIntyre (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), p. 61.
139 MacDougall, "Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists?," pp. 76-77.
140 Serinata had previously been the Ketua (Chair) of the provincial legislature. For further details of these 
events, see Sayuti and Langitan, Perjalanan Orang Sasak Menjadi Gubernur.
141 The reason for the lack of detail about these clashes stems from the fact that local people are sensitive 
about this period in many ways, more so than for the January 2000 riots. Questions about these events 
would often elicit only silence, or a quick change of topic. It never became clear to me what memories, 
concerns, or attitudes underpinned this sensitivity.
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development of a close working relationship between Kesbanglinmas and many Tuan 
Guru. The second element was an "agreement" among members of the local political 
elite to guarantee representation of a Sasak politician and a counterpart from 
Sumbawa142 on each ticket. The third element ensured localized security arrangements 
were negotiated to forestall pamswakarsa participation.143
Ali's approach unknowingly reflected conflict-management strategies adopted by 
scholars, such as John Paul Lederach. Avoidance or resolution of communal or political 
conflict is best served, according to Lederach, by state actors combining their activities 
and thus cooperating with non-state grassroots actors and organizations.144 These 
grassroots organizations are important because they form networks of relationships, 
mustering people who are able to facilitate and coordinate activity. It is important to 
deploy and utilize leadership and institutions that are respected, capable, and strongly 
networked, whether state or non-state.145 Lederach emphasizes non-state leadership 
and social relationships when discussing conflict management, giving support to the 
idea that social order and stability are not just about police patrols or judicial 
sanctions.146 Local Lombok intellectuals have come to similar conclusions. For instance, 
Abdul Wahid, a lecturer at the State Islamic Institute of Mataram, wrote an article in 
the Lombok Post endorsing partnerships between state and non-state leaders and 
organizations as effective means to manage social tension and conflict.147
In Lombok, Tuan Guru and their religious organizations fulfill this role of creating a 
web (network) of relationships between different levels of society and parts of 
Lombok.148 An example of this is the network that surrounds TGH Mustiadi Abhar. He 
is the head of the Islamic boarding school, Darul Falah, in Pagutan, Mataram, which 
enrolls about 550 santri (students).149 However, Mustiadi is actually at the center of a 
much larger religious, social, and political organization based on his links with the 
alumni of the boarding school, coordinated through an organization called IKADAFA 
(Ikatan Alumni Darul Falah, Association of Alumni of Darul Falah). This network 
includes an estimated 160,000 members and is built upon a coalition of approximately 
twenty Tuan Guru and a similar number of Islamic boarding schools spread across 
Mataram and West Lombok. These religious leaders work as an integrated group, 
under the stewardship of Mustiadi. IKADAFA is also affiliated with NU and its web of
142 There are two ethnic groups on Sumbawa—the Sumbawa and the Bimanese. Each campaign ticket 
needed to list a representative from either one of these two communities.
143 Tuan Guru and politicians utilized their connection with pamswakarsa to ensure these groups were kept 
inactive during the election period. See "Tuan Guru Bajang: Hindari Black Campaign," Lombok Post, April 
7, 2008, p. 1; and "Diintimidasi, Ismail Husni Ajak Semua Pihak Arif," Lombok Post, April 24, 2008, p. 1.
144 J. P. Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, DC: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), pp. 38-55.
145 Ibid., pp. 114-15.
146 Ibid., pp. 38-55.
147 Abdul Wahid, "NTB Plural Perlu Gerakan Harmoni," Lombok Post, August 11, 2008, p. 15.
148 J. P. Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), p. 83.
149 For discussion of the history, organization, and size of Darul Falah, see Muhammad Dimiati, "Peran 
Pondok Pesantren Darul Falah Dalam Mendukung Pencapaian Kriteria Ketuntasan Minimal Bidang Studi 
Pendidikan Agama Islam Siswa Kelas XI SMA Darul Falah Pagutan Kota Mataram Tahun 2010/ 2011" 
(Honors thesis, IAIN Mataram, 2011), pp. 45-65.
76 Jeremy J. Kingsley
religious leaders and organizations across Lombok.150 IKADAFA and NU, therefore, 
provide an example of the networks of leaders and communities that were mobilized 
in the lead-up to the elections in order to ensure conflict was avoided.
The weaving of non-state actors and institutions into government processes and 
strategies has been highlighted in the work of Peter Evans. He has suggested that 
"creative action by government organizations can foster social capital; linking 
mobilized citizens to public agencies can enhance the efficacy of government."151 This 
is exactly what happened when Kesbanglinmas worked cooperatively with Tuan Guru 
and their organizations, such as IKADAFA and NU. Public servants utilized non-state 
religious networks and thereby avoided taxing the government's already limited 
resources. Reliance on non-state actors and organizations cannot be taken too lightly, 
as Joshua Barker and Gerry van Klinken have asserted, because "... the actually 
existing state in Indonesia is spread thin. It is fragmented, overwhelmed, and 
ineffective."152 The messages developed by Ali's team were communicated through the 
religious networks in Lombok, which provided a respected and efficient mechanism 
for the dissemination of information.
Ali's team used the authority of Tuan Guru to underpin this state initiative. One 
proponent of the strategy, TGH Munajid Khalid, noted that election violence had 
occurred elsewhere in Indonesia, and he felt particularly passionate about avoiding 
communal violence in Lombok in the aftermath of the January 2000 riots.153 The Tuan 
Gurus' strong endorsement of the strategy was clearly communicated during Friday 
religious sermons (khutbah) and religious education classes (pengajian), thus proactively 
guarding against an escalation of tensions that had the potential to turn violent.154
When teaching about the importance of social harmony during the election 
preparations, TGH Muharror used the Islamic principle of silaturrahim (keeping good 
relations with others) to guide his followers.155The lesson, he said, is "not only related 
to fellow Muslims, but also requires people to keep peaceful relations with people from 
other religions."156 Muharror asserted that there is no religious prohibition for making 
friends with anyone, as long as they give respect to each other's beliefs.157
When I spoke with Tuan Guru about conflict management, in general, and with 
particular reference to the 2008 elections, there was an almost unanimous response
150 NU is strongest in western and central Lombok, although it does have a presence across the island. This 
large traditionalist Islamic mass movement provides a religious network that connects the Tuan Guru and 
their organizations to over half of Lombok's three million residents through a web of interrelationships.
151 Peter Evans, "Government Action, Social Capital, and Development: Reviewing the Evidence of 
Synergy," World Development 24,6 (1996): 1130.
152 Gerry van Klinken and Joshua Barker, "Introduction: State in Society in Indonesia," in State of Authority: 
The State in Society in Indonesia, ed. Gerry van Klinken and Joshua Barker (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast 
Asia Program Publications, 2009), p. 23.
153 Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid, Gunung Sari, West Lombok, August 24, 2003.
154 One community leader told me that there was a positive atmosphere during the campaign that allowed 
candidates on the different political tickets to visit his kampung without any problem. Interview with Drun 
[pseud.], Mataram, July 28, 2008.
155 Electronic interview with TGH Muharror, May 11, 2009.
156 Ibid. Very similar sentiments were expressed by TGH Wawan Stiawan; see electronic interview with 
TGH Wawan Stiawan, July 18, 2009.
157 Electronic interview with TGH Muharror, May 11, 2009.
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regarding the obligation to maintain social unity and build ta'awwun (an atmosphere of 
helping each other). Once again, their focus was not on interactions exclusively among 
Muslims, but also concerned interactions with non-Muslims.158 Ali worked with Tuan 
Guru to coordinate their statements and actions, but each Tuan Guru tailored his 
message to the expectations of his community. For example, TGH Wawan Stiawan 
citied a similar theological dictate about the necessity of social harmony, but noted that 
the lesson he taught during pengajian or khutbah depended on the particular situation 
or problems that society faced.159 160Incorporated into every one of his lessons was the 
assertion that "Islam is a peaceful religion" and the reminder that Muslims need to 
follow this basic principle.180 Religious teachings about social harmony are derived 
from Qur'anic injunctions. TGH Muharror and TGH Wawan Stiawan, for example, 
both pointed to one Qur'anic Surah (Chapter) in particular, Surah Al-Hujurat 49:10- 
13.161
10: The Believers are but a single Brotherhood: so make peace and reconciliation 
between two brothers; and fear Allah, that ye may receive Mercy.
13: O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and 
made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may 
despise each other)."
Qur'an, 49:10 and 13.162 163
These Qur'anic verses provide strong support to Tuan Guru who seek to maintain 
social harmony and calm during periods of tension, such as elections. TGH Muharror 
felt that this surah communicated two key messages to his santri (followers). First, he 
said, Muslims are brothers and sisters and should treat each other well. Second, the 
Qur'an says that God created all people, giving them different religions and ethnic 
backgrounds in order that they should seek to know and respect each other.1”3 These 
parts of Surah Al-Hujurat are the theological backbone for promoting a plurality of 
opinions and political positions and also respectfully acknowledging a diversity of 
ethnic and religious backgrounds. Religious teachings from this part of the Qur'an 
provide Tuan Guru with a strong justification and source of authority if they choose to 
participate in conflict management.
In situations involving contests, such as elections, Tuan Guru often become active 
participants in avoiding or resolving tensions. The Tuan Guru told me that their efforts 
to prevent conflict involved two primary steps: first, engaging with protagonists by 
attempting to comprehend their position, while also calming emotions; and, second,
158 Ibid.
159 Electronic interview with TGH Wawan Stiawan, July 18, 2009.
160 Ibid.
161 Electronic interview with TGH Muharror, May 11, 2009; and electronic interview with TGH Wawan 
Stiawan, July 18, 2009.
162 A. Y. Ali (translator), The Holy Qur'an (Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 2000).
163 Electronic interview with TGH Muharror, May 11, 2009.
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taking direct action to mediate between potential antagonists.164 More specifically, 
TGH Wawan Stiawan explained his approach to conflict management:1'"1
The first time that I confront a conflict, I have to examine the case, what is its 
cause, why has it happened, and so forth. Most conflicts in society happen 
because of misunderstandings. And after finding what triggers it, then I ask the 
people to discuss it with me and together to find out the solution. Usually I ask 
representatives from each group that is fighting to come to me (or I go to them) 
and ask them what they want, and then try to find out the best way to satisfy all 
of them.
Tuan Guru often take direct action in the efforts to defuse tense situations that 
threaten to become explosive. TGH Subkhi Sasaki said he would go to the mosque to 
make statements over the loud speaker urging restraint, while TGH Munajid Khalid 
told me about "hitting the street" to ensure that potential provocateurs were calmed 
down.166 Both these religious leaders stressed that they were prepared to confront 
people directly in order to try to dissuade them from participation in violence. For 
example, TGH Munajid Khalid told me about his experiences during the January 2000 
riots, saying "I went walking around my community with government officials, trying 
to cool people down, and at night I called on the mosque loud speakers for people to 
stop their bad behavior."167 Khalid told me that he would continue to intervene during 
elections if necessary.168
Tuan Guru don't just rely on persuasion through lessons grounded in theology, but 
also enforce sanctions on people who disregard their instructions. TGH Wawan 
Stiawan said that "The first time I call upon them [the protagonists] and give them 
advice about appropriate behavior according to Islamic teachings. But if, after this 
advice, they continue to create problems and ferment social disorder, I will punish 
them."169 As discussed earlier, this sort of punishment has tangible consequences for 
those who have been disciplined and strong religious resonance.
As has been seen, Tuan Guru played an important role in maintaining an 
atmosphere of calm during the 2008 elections. Provincial authorities also sought to 
prevent violence by working with the political elite of Lombok and Sumbawa to 
subdue tensions. Key political players came to an "understanding" among themselves 
and agreed to establish a power-sharing arrangement. The parties involved in the 
gubernatorial elections, which chose the candidates on the different political tickets, 
agreed to appoint a Sasak as calon (candidate) and a politician from Sumbawa as wakil 
(deputy).170 While there is no formal documentation outlining this compromise,
164 For a detailed example of how this occurs, see Jeremy Kingsley, "Democracy, Conflict, and Islamic 
Leadership in Eastern Indonesia: A Village Election Case Study."
165 Electronic interview with TGH Wawan Stiawan, July 18, 2009.
166 Interview with TGH Subkhi Sasaki, Kediri, West Lombok, August 23, 2008; and interview with TGH 
Munajid Khalid, Gunung Sari, West Lombok, August 24, 2008.
167 Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid, Gunung Sari, West Lombok, August 24, 2008.
Ibid.
169 Electronic interview with TGH Wawan Stiawan, July 18, 2009.
170 Several members of the election teams that I spoke with described how an ethnic balance among leaders 
from Lombok and Sumbawa was a political reality.
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anecdotal evidence from several campaign teams confirmed that a deal had indeed 
been struck.171 172A senior NTB Golkar official confidentially acknowledged the need to 
maintain an "ethnic balance" in gubernatorial tickets.1/2 The hierarchy evident on the 
ballots, which favors a Sasak over a representative from Sumbawa, arguably reflects 
the demographics of the province,173 since there are just over three million people 
living in Lombok, compared to approximately one million in Sumbawa.14 175
For the time being, this power-sharing agreement, which allocated the rewards of 
office between the political elites from Lombok and Sumbawa, seems to be working. 
However, its sustainability is questionable due to the inequitable nature of the 
arrangement, which effectively precludes any person from Sumbawa becoming 
governor. This restrictive (for Sumbawa) political arrangement is one of the reasons 
that there are now calls for Sumbawa to become a separate province.' "This split 
would have a direct economic effect on Lombok because a significant portion of 
provincial revenue comes from the Newmont gold mine in Sumbawa, a reality 
politicians in Lombok certainly recognize.176
Implementation of Conflict Management
In order to prepare for the 2008 gubernatorial elections, the staff of Kesbanglinmas 
and other government departments were involved in intensive consultations with a
171 This form of pairing of candidates to maintain "ethnic balances" has been seen elsewhere in Indonesia, 
for instance in West Kalimantan and Central Sulawesi. See Taufiq Tanasaldy, "Ethnic Identity Politics in 
West Kalimantan," in Renegoitating Boundaries in Post-Suharto Indonesi, ed. Henk Schulte Nordholt and 
Gerry van Klinken (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), pp. 362-71; Rachel Diprose, "Passing on the Challenges or 
Prescribing Better Management of Diversity? Decentralisation, Power Sharing in Conflict Dynamics in 
Central Sulawesi, Indonesia," Conflict, Security, and Development 8,4 (2008): 414; and Benny Subianto, 
"Ethnic Politics and the Rise of Dayak Bureaucrats in Local Elections: Pilkada in Six Kabupaten in West 
Kalimantan," in Deepening Democracy in Indonesia?, ed. MaribethErb and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 344—47. The practice of setting up ethnic and 
religious coalitions more generally is discussed in Leonard C. Sebastian, "The Paradox of Indonesian 
Democracy," Contemporary Southeast Asia 26,2 (2004): 256-79.
172 Anonymous Golkar political operative, email message to author, May 19, 2009.
173 This sort of political arrangement that accommodates demographic realities has occurred in other 
Indonesian provinces. See Subianto, "Ethnic Politics and the Rise of Dayak Bureaucrats in Local 
Elections," p. 328; and Edward Aspinall, Sebastian Dettman, and Eva Warburton, "When Religion Trumps 
Ethnicity: A Regional Election Case Study from Indonesia," p. 40.
174 Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi NTB, Nusa Tenggara Barat Dalam Angka 2010, p. 67.
175 Sumbawa's proposed secession from NTB is promoted on websites, such as www.sumbawanews.com. 
The website carries the slogan: "Masa Depart Kami Provinsi Sumbawa" (In the future we will be the Province 
of Sumbawa). Until the end of 2010, there had been a moratorium on the establishment of new provinces. 
See "Moratorium on Regional Autonomy," Tempo, August 5, 2009, www.tempointeractive.com. As of 
October 1, 2011, it is unclear whether this moratorium has been officially extended. However, the 
secession process appears to be moving forward, for the current NTB governor recently endorsed 
Sumbawa's intention to become an independent province at some point in the future. TGH M. Zainul 
Majdi, Letter to Public, July 18, 2011. See also, "Gubernur Teken Rekomendasi," Lombok Post, July 19, 2011, 
P-1.
176 The Newmont Mine generates over 35 percent of the province's gross domestic product (GDP). This is 
over 10 percent more than any other sector of the economy, such as tourism or farming. See BAPPEDA 
Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat and Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat, Tinjauan 
Perekonomian Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat 2006 (Mataram: Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Nusa Tenggara 
Barat, 2007), p. 14.
80 Jeremy J. Kingsley
broad range of local non-state community and religious leaders.1'These briefings 
ensured that non-state leaders participated in the provincial authority's conflict- 
avoidance strategy and were carefully advised on how the policy would work. Ali 
attended seminars, liaised with Tuan Guru, and ensured that the police had carefully 
negotiated security arrangements with local authorities.* 1781 observed Ali discuss the 
upcoming elections with community and religious leaders at a September 2007 seminar 
run by Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN).179In his presentation, Ali 
outlined a variety of ways that these non-state leaders could help maintain calm within 
their communities during the gubernatorial elections. At the seminar, he addressed the 
audience while seated symbolically next to a prominent Tuan Guru.180
With all these measures in place, the elections on July 7, 2008, then tested the NTB 
provincial government's conflict-management strategy. The atmosphere that day 
turned out to be calm, unmarred by disruptions, according to reports. The social 
control emanating from communal and religious leaders meant that there was not even 
a large police presence. While criss-crossing town on motorbike, I noticed fewer police 
than usual, and, in fact, I saw no police apart from those escorting local officials and 
Tuan Guru to polling stations.
An important tactical aspect of the police response on election day was that 
Linmas, the community auxiliary force, was recruited to help maintain order and 
essentially formed the core of the policing strategy. Linmas was present at all polling 
stations, while the police remained in their barracks (the police have said that they 
were prepared to act if large-scale protests and civil disturbances occurred during the 
elections).181 Linmas volunteers who were involved far outnumbered the police. In 
Central Lombok, 510 police officers were on duty on election day, supported by 2,558 
Linmas members. Similar preparations were made in other parts of Lombok and 
Sumbawa.182 This open and very public role of Linmas, whose members are derived 
from local communities, contrasts with the prepared, but invisible, role of the police, 
again underscoring the importance of non-state (or, in this circumstance, quasi-state) 
actors in maintaining social harmony and avoiding conflict.
The election resulted in an overwhelming victory for TGH Bajang, who, at that 
time, was affiliated with PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang, Crescent Star Party) and PKS 
(Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Prosperous Justice Party), and the ousting of incumbent 
governor and Golkar candidate Lalu Serinata. Despite this dramatic outcome, no
Even though tins article focuses upon religious leaders, the strategy of Kesbanglinmas was not just 
limited to this category of non-state leaders. In my opinion, however, the religious leaders were the most 
important actors in suppressing potential disruptions during the elections.
178 "Kodim 1606 Lobar Gandeng Pamswakarsa," Lombok Post, July 7, 2008, p. 9.
179 Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara means Adat Society Alliance of the Indonesian Archipelago. The 
revival of adat practices and identification with adat has been discussed in the work of many recent 
scholars, such as Avonius, Reforming Wetn Telu; and Jamie S. Davidson and David Henley, eds., The Revival 
of Tradition in Indonesian Politics: The Deployment of Adat from Colonialism to Indigenism (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2007).
180 Field notes, September 10, 2007.
181 "Amankan Pilkada, Polda NTB Terjunkan Kekuatan Penuh," Lombok Post, June 17, 2008, p. 1.
182 "Pengamanan Pilkada, Korem Siapkan 10 SSK," Lombok Post, March 19, 2008, p. 9; "Show Force Pasukan 
Pengamanan Pilkada Lombok Timur," Lombok Post, April 19, 2008, p. 9; "Pilkada, Polres Loteng Siapkan 
3068 Personil," Lombok Post, June 19, 2008 p. 9.
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violence was reported during the election campaign, on election day or during the 
two-month transition period between the election and the inauguration of the new 
governor on September 1, 2008. Considering the corruption scandals that were circling 
Serinata and some of his supporters at the time, scandals involving the imminent 
threat of prosecution, the significance of the avoidance of conflict during and 
subsequent to the elections should not be understated. The strategies described here 
had contributed to keeping the peace, even though political power had changed hands 
after a tough election campaign and the threat of criminal prosecution was looming for 
the defeated candidate, Serinata.
Conclusion
The NTB 2008 provincial elections are a lens through which one can look to 
understand social order and organization in Lombok society. The steps taken to 
prepare for these elections may be instructive for other provinces and local regencies 
across Indonesia preparing for the almost continual cycle of national, provincial, 
regency, and city elections.1831 argue that customized local frameworks of partnerships 
between state and non-state actors and institutions have the potential for broader 
application across Indonesia. The case study developed in this article identifies the 
efficacy of theories of social capital promoted by Peter Evans, who analyzed the way 
that constructive interaction, or "complementarity," between state and non-state actors 
can have a positive impact upon government programs and social/economic 
development.184
The case study investigated in this article does not provide a template for conflict 
management. Rather, it highlights the utility of local conflict-management processes. 
The strategy outlined used flexible frameworks that were able to change as 
circumstances necessitated and that relied on socially respected leaders. Importantly, 
this case illustrates the potential for effective, multi-layered conflict-management 
processes that combine state and non-state actors and institutions.
When one considers conflict management in post-Suharto Lombok, it is clear that 
state legal responses, such as statutes concerned with public order or criminal law 
enforcement, are important. However, during the 2008 gubernatorial elections in 
Lombok, these processes were not as effective as community-focused partnerships 
between state and non-state leaders. Tuan Guru, in this instance, were peacemakers, 
but they also had, and have, the potential to be peace-breakers. The Tuan Gurus' 
control of pamszvakarsa and the allegations that they have sometimes played a role in 
marginalizing minority groups, such as Ahmadiyah, demonstrate their potential to be 
peace-breakers. Despite this, the violence that had marred earlier election processes in 
Lombok did not occur during the 2008 elections, and Tuan Guru played a significant 
part in the outcome. In this situation, the religious leaders contributed positively to the 
avoidance of violence.
183 Jusuf Kalla, "Making Good Economic and Social Policy in a Democratic Indonesia: An Insider's 
Perspective," lecture, Indonesia Study Group, Australian National University, Canberra, June 10, 2010.
184 Peter Evans, "Government Action, Social Capital, and Development: Reviewing the Evidence of 
Synergy," pp. 1119-21.
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While Ali's strategy related specifically to Lombok, these partnership arrangements 
between state and non-state actors and institutions may have broader application in 
Indonesia. They allow government institutions effectively to maintain, or regain, social 
stability during periods of potential or actual communal conflict, without resorting to 
police or military force. This approach, involving active cooperation between state and 
non-state actors in Lombok, added depth to the provincial authority's response and 
allowed for grassroots participation in the era of Indonesian democratization.
